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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANTHONY G. HARRIS, Receiver 
of Mobile Insurance Company, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
ROBERT BRIGGS and INTER-
MOUNTAIN GENERAL AGENCY, INC. 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16841 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves a suit by the Statutory Receiver 
of a Texas insurance company against its agent Robert Briggs, 
a Utah resident, as an individual, and Intermountain General 
Agency, Inc., the Utah corporation through which he does 
business. On September 21, 1978, the District Court of Travis 
County, Texas, entered a final judgment against the defendants 
Briggs and Intermountain, jointly and severally for 
$145,654e57 plus interest. The judgment was never satisfied, 
and the plaintiff-receiver sought to enforce the Texas 
judgment against the defendants in the Third District Court of 
Utah. 
-1-
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Prior to trial, the plaintiff moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that the Texas judgment was final and that 
therefore, the Utah court should afford it full faith and ere-
dit and enforce it as a matter of law. The defendants also 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Texas court never 
acquired personal jurisdiction over them and therefore, its 
judgment against them was void and unenforceable. On November 
15, 1979, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. At the same time, it granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, stating that the 
Texas judgment had been rendered without personal jurisdiction 
over the defendants and hence was not entitled to full faith 
and credit. Because plaintiff's and defendants' motions 
addressed different issues, and because the defendants' motion 
had not been filed in a timely manner, a question arose as to 
whether the defendants' motion had been fully argued. The 
trial court granted a motion for reconsideration and enter-
tained additional affidavits and argument on the issue of 
whether the Texas court had personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants. On November 27, 1979, the trial court ruled that 
due process required the plaintiff to try his claims in Utah, 
and again granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
From these judgments, the plaintiff appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal of both summary 
judgments entered November 15, 1979, and November 27, 1979, 
and an order that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be 
granted. Alternatively, plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal 
of both the trial court's summary judgments in favor of defen-
dants and a remand to the trial level for adjudication of the 
factual and legal issues. 
FACTS 
On May 1, 1972, defendants Robert D. Briggs (Briggs) 
and Intermountain General Agency, Inc. (Intermountain) entered 
a general agency agreement with Mobile Insurance Company 
(Mobile) located in Dallas, Texas.. (R 122-126). Pursuant to 
this contract, defendants became the agents and fiduciaries of 
Mobile, and until August of 1975 conducted a continuous course 
of insurance business between themselves and the Texas 
insurance company. Defendants solicited, sold and issued 
insurance policies in Utah on Mobile. On a regular monthly 
basis, the defendants collected and remitted premiums to the 
Texas insurance company. Throughout the agency relationship 
there was continual correspondence and telephone communication 
between Mobile and the defendants. Policies were issued in 
.. Texas, and the records of the transactions between Mobile and 
defendants were generated and stored in Texas. Loss claims 
-3-
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were filed in Texas where they were reviewed and allowed or 
disallowed. Payments pursuant to the agency contract were 
made in Texas, and an account was established there between 
Mobile and the defendants. (R 129-132). 
On or about August 21, 1975, delinquency proceedings 
were commenced by the State of Texas against Mobile Insurance 
Company under Articles 2le28 and 21.28-C of the Texas 
Insurance Code. Mobile Insurance Company was placed in 
receivership and Herbert Crook was duly appointed as Receiver. 
Plaintiff-appellant Harris was subsequently appointed to 
succeed Mr. Crook. 
On or about August 19, 1977, a complaint was filed by 
,,, 
plaintiff's predecessor, as receiver of Mobile, against Briggs .. , 
and Intermountain, alleging that defendants ::: previously had 
entered into a general agency agreement with Mobile and that i:: 
ii: they were delinquent in paying earned premiums and unearned ··· 
commissions owed to Mobile. (R 133-138) • The Receiver sought ~ 
to recover those amounts owing to the Mobile Receivership, and i!~ 
filed his original petition in the 20lst Judicial District :i1 
Court of Travis County, Texas. Defendant Briggs filed a 1ijv 
Special appearance and Motion to Quash on or about August 31, 0 
1977. On March 22, 1978, plaintiff filed his First Amended::: 
Original Petition. Defendants 
.. 
were served with copies on •· 
March 27, 1978, by service upon the Texas secretary of State 
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in accordance with TexeRevaCivoStateAnne, Art. 203lb. Actual 
notice was given thereafter to the defendants by the Secretary 
of State for the State of Texas., (R 16; 49-50; 131). 
In March, 1978, defendants Briggs and Intermountain 
filed an answer in the Texas proceeding, preserving the spe-
cial appearancee This answer was signed by Briggs personally 
and mailed in an envelope bearing the address of his attorney, 
Mr o Lambertus Jansen. (R 64-66). Thereafter, plaintiff 
filed a brief in opposition to the special appearance of the 
defendants, and the special appearance was noticed for hearing 
on September 14, 1978. 
On June 23, 1978, Briggs was deposed in Salt Lake 
City in the Texas action. The deposition was taken in the 
office of Lambertus Jansen, who appeared as counsel for 
Briggs.. Thereafter, on July 18, 1978, notice was given to 
defendants by the District Court for Travis County, Texas, 
that hearing on their special appearance had been set for 
September 14, 1978, at 2:00 o'clock p.me (R 69). Plaintiff's 
counsel in the Texas proceeding, Mr. Byron L. Wooley, also 
advised defendants' counsel by letter that Brigg's special 
appearance was set for hearing on that day and that trial in 
the matter was set for a week later on September 21, 1978. (R 
72-77). 
On September 14, 1978, at the duly noticed hearing of 
-5-
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their special appearance, defendants failed to appear. 
Plaintiff presented evidence and the Texas Court entered its 
order overruling defendants' special appearance. (R 78}. 
Defendants Briggs and Intermountain took no action on this 
ruling, and did nothing further with regard to their answer. 
Trial was held on September 21, 1978, but defendants did not 
appear. Plaintiff presented evidence in support of his 
petition. After reviewing the file and considering the 
evidence, the court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to 
recover on his complaint, and entered final judgment against 
the defendants in an amount substantially less than that 
prayed for by plaintiff. (R 82-84) • To date, this judgment 
remains wholly unsatisfied; no payment or partial payment has 
been made. (R 3, ~5; 86). 
On January 29, 1979, plaintiff filed a complaint in a 
district court of Utah, seeking to enforce the Texas judgment 
against the defendants. (R 2). Plaintiff moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the Texas judgment must be afforded 
full faith and credit and enforced as a matter of law. (R 
24-90) • Defendants also moved for summary judgment, but on a 
different ground, claiming that the Texas court never acquired 
personal jurisdiction over them, and that the judgment of the 
Texas court was consequently void. (R 90-100). The trial 
court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted the 
-6-
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I~ 
!" jl.• 
defendants'. {R 150). Upon reconsideration and further argu-
rnent on the issue of personal jurisdiction, the trial court 
again granted the defendants' motion (R 154), and the plain-
tiff took this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE TEXAS JUDGMENT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
FULL FAITif AND CREDI~ THE TEXAS JUDGM~WAS RES JUDICATA 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS ON ALL ISSUES, INCLUDING PERSONAL JURIS-
DICTION, AND CANNOT NOW BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED. 
Subpoint A: The Issue of Jurisdiction was 
Raised and Litigated in the Teias Action and the Judgment_ 
Against Defendant in that Action Is Therefore Res Judicata. 
While it is ~stablished that a court in one state, 
when asked to give effect to the judgment of a court in 
another state, may cons ti tutiona-lly inquire into the foreign 
court's jurisdiction to render the judgment, the modern deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court have carefully 
lirni ted the permissible scope of such inquiry. Those deci-
sions expound a general rule that a judgment is entitled to 
full faith and credit, even as to questions of jurisdiction, 
when the second court's inquiry discloses that those questions 
have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in 
the court which rendered the original judgment., Durfee v. 
Duke, 375 u.s. 106, 111, 84 s.ct. 242, 245 (1963). 
This rule was unambiguously established by the 
Supreme court in Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assoc., 
-7-
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283 U.S. 5 2 2, 51 S. Ct. 51 7, 7 5 L. Ed. 12 4 4 ( 19 3 0) , on facts 
nearly identical to those of the instant case. There the 
defendant had been sued in a Missouri federal district court. 
He appeared specially and moved to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The Missouri court overruled his special 
appearance. Defendant did nothing further with regard to his 
jurisdictional challenge, and the cause proceeded to final 
judgment. The defendant did not appeal the judgment. 
Thereafter, the plaintiff sought to enforce the judgment 
against the defendant in the federal district court of Iowa. 
At this second trial, the defendant claimed that the fit-st 
court had never had personal jurisdiction over him and 
therefore, its judgment could not be enforced. The plaintiff ' 
objected to this collateral attack, but the Iowa court , 
overruled him and dismissed his suit. On appeal, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed, noting that the defendant had two 
options. First, he had the right to appeal the Missouri 
judgment. Secondly, he could have elected not to appear at 
all in the Missouri proceeding. Under this second option, the 
defendant would never have had his day in court on the issue 
of jurisdiction, and if the Missouri court had proceeded to 
judgment in his absence, he could have raised and tried the 
jurisdictional question when the plaintiff sought to have the 
Missouri judgment enforced against him in Iowa. But the 
-8-
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c~: 
defendant exercised neither options Rather, he appeared 
before the Missouri court for the very purpose of litigating 
the jurisdictional issue, and then having lost it, simply 
waited and raised the same issue again when the plaintiff 
sought to enforce the judgment in Iowa. The Supreme Court, 
however, refused to allow such a tack, and reversed, holding 
that the Missouri judgment as to personal jurisdiction was res 
judicata as to the defendant. 
The defendants in the instant case had the same two 
options. They either could have failed to appear in the Texas 
action and then defended the issue of jurisdiction in the Utah 
court, or, once having raised and lost the issue of jurisdic-
tion in Texas, they could have appealed the decision of the 
district court to the Texas Supreme Courts Having chosen 
neither option, they should not now be allowed to have a 
second day in court to collaterally attack the judgment of the 
Texas forume As the court in Baldwin stated, "Public policy 
dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who 
have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the 
contest, and that matters once tried shall be forever settled 
as between the parties." 283 U.S. at 525; 51 S.Ct. at 518. 
Following the Baldwin case, the Supreme Court made 
clear in a series of decisions that the general rule is the 
same whether the claim is that the original forum did not have 
-9-
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jurisdiction over the person or over the subject matter. 
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S .. Ct. 3, 83 L.Ed. 26 (1938); 
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 s.ct. 134, 83 L.Ed. 104 
(1938); Trinies v. sunshine Mining co., 308 u.s. 66, 60 s.ct. 
44, 84 L.Ed. 85 {1939); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 
s.ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed. 1429 {1948). In each of these cases, the 
claim was made that a court, when asked to enforce the 
judgment of another forum, was free to retry the issue of the 
original forum's jurisdiction. In each case, the Supreme 
court held that since the question of jurisdiction had been 
fully litigated in the original forum, the issue could not be ~ 
retried in a subsequent action between the parties. 
The reasons for such a rule are apparent. 
words of the court in Stoll v. Gottlieb, supra: 
We see no reason why a court in the absence of 
an allegation of fraud in obtaining the 
judgment, should examine again the question 
whether the court making the ear lier deter-
mination on an actual contest over jur isdic-
tion between parties, did have jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of the litigation •. 
Courts to determine the rights of parties 
are an integral part of our system of 
government. It is just as important that 
there should be a place to end as that there 
should be a place to begin litigation. After 
a party has had his day in court, with oppor-
tunity to present his evidence and his view of 
the law, a collateral attack upon the decision 
as to jurisdiction there rendered merely re-
tries the issue previously determined. 305 
u.s. at 172; 59 s.ct. at 138. 
-10-
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Notwithstanding the fact that defendants failed to 
appear at the hearing on their special appearance, they may be 
held to have fairly and fully litigated the jurisdictional 
issue and therefore, to be bound by its determination. The 
united States Supreme Court has not directly faced the issue 
of whether a defendant, by failing to actually appear at the 
hearing on his special jurisdictional appearance, can avoid 
the determination of that issue. However, other courts con-
sidering this question have concluded that once having raised 
the jurisdictional issue, the defendant cannot then avoid the 
results of the determination of that issue by simply failing 
in some way to advance whatever defenses he may have had. 
Moreover, comments by the Supreme Court indicate that it also 
would so conclude were it squarely confronted with the issue. 
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 
L.Ed. 1429 (1948), was an action in which a Massachusetts 
citizen appeared in a court of that state to contest a divorce 
previously granted to his wife by a state court of Florida. 
On appeal, the supreme Court concluded that "due process_ of 
law" did not demand that he be afforded a second opportunity 
to litigate the existence of jurisdictional facts. There, the 
court said: 
[T] he rule has evolved that the doc-
trine of ~ judicata applies to adjudications 
relating either to jurisdiction of the person 
-11-
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or of the subject where such adjudications 
have been made in proceedings in which those 
questions were in issue and in which the par-
ties have been given full opportunity to liti-
gate. 334 u.s. at 350; 68 s.ct. at 1090. 
The Court indicated that there was nothing to suggest that the 
Florida court would not have evaluated fairly and in good 
faith all relevant evidence submitted to ito The Court went 
on to say: 
If respondent failed to take advantage of the 
opportunity afforded him, the responsibility 
is his own. We do not believe that the dere-
liction of a defendant under such circumstan-
ces should be permitted to provide a basis for 
subsequent attack in the courts of a sister 
state on a decree valid in the state in which 
it was rendered. 334 U.S. at 352; 68 s.ct. at 
1091. 
It appears clear that the Supreme Court is concerned ~ 
with (1) whether the issue of jurisdiction has been raised, i~ 
and (2) whether the defendant has had an opportunity to pre- 1 
sent evidence on that issue. In the present case, it is ill 
obvious that defendant raised the issue by his special ~ 
appearance and there is no suggestion whatsoever that def en- :v~ 
dant was precluded from presenting whatever evidence he ~ 
desired in support of his special appearance. 
In Raynor v. Stockton Savings & Loan Bank, 332 P.2d 416, :li 
420 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 1958), the appellate court stated: 1~~ 
The question as to whether the rule of Sherrer 
and Coe cases includes a situation in which a ::: 
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nonresident defendant merely entered his or 
her appearance in the divorce proceedings 
without any participation therein has not yet 
been squarely decided by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. However, the reasoning in 
the Sherrer and Coe cases, which turns upon 
the nonresident defendant's opportunity to 
raise the issue of domicile, seems to indicate 
that entry of appearance of itself can satisfy 
the Sherrer and Coe ruleQ 
The California Supreme Court stated in Heuer v. 
Heuer, 201 P.2d 385, 387 (Cal. 1949), that the test is not 
whether the issue of jurisdiction was actively litigated in 
the court rendering the divorce decree. That court found it 
sufficient that the defendant had participated in the pro-
ceeding and had full opportunity to litigate that issue. 
In Sanpietro v. Collins, 250 CalQApp.2d 203, 58 
CaloRptr. 219 (1967), the defendant, a resident of California, 
was served with papers in an Arizona act ion .. He consulted 
counsel in Arizona concerning liability .. He stated to his 
Arizona attorneys that he wanted to contest the matter in 
California, not in Arizona. Nevertheless, he did agree upon a 
course of action suggested by his attorneys that they apprise 
the Arizona court of the jurisdictional question which existed 
in the case without pressing it by simply filing a motion to 
dismiss on the basis of jurisdiction. Defendant did not pur-
sue the motion and did not appear to argue it. However, the 
Arizona court denied the motion to dismiss and default 
judgment was subsequently entered against the defendant. The 
California court said: 
-13-
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The circumstance that the Arizona court's ad-
judication that it had jurisdiction of the 
defendants was triggered by a motion to 
dismiss rather than the step in an action, 
should make no difference in the effect to be 
given it • . . and surely it is not the rule 
that a party may notice a motion, then having 
a full opportunity to be heard in its support, 
remain silent and, if it is denied, insist 
that it does not affect him because he did not 
argue it. 219 Cal.Rptr. at 
Considering a similar case, Justice Van Voorhis of the New 1 
York supreme Court used analogous rationale in a comment par- 1 
ticularly appropriate to the instant case: 
As said in the opinion of Justice Holmes in 
German Savings L Loan Society ~ Dormi tser, 
192 U.S. 125, 128, 24 S.Ct. 221, 222, 48 L.Ed. 
373, "A respondent cannot defeat jurisdiction 
by disappearing. Indeed, in strictness, only 
the attorney disappeared, and the respondent 
simply ceased ·to defend the suit." Were the 
rule otherwise, it would enable parties to 
appear in courts of sister states, but to make 
a hasty exit before judgment if met with a 
judicial frown. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 92 
N.Y.S.2d 338 (1949). -
It is clear from the above cases that the trial court 
should have given the Texas decision full faith and credit and 
foreclosed any argument by the defendants on the question of 
jurisdiction. Having once raised the issue in Texas by virtue 
of their special appearance, then having had opportunity to 
present whatever evidence they wished on that issue, and that 
issue having been judicially determined by the District court 
of Travis County, Texas, the decision is now conclusive as 
-14-
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against defendants and should not be reli tigated in the Utah 
courts. 
As pointed out in Moody Y..!__ First National Bank of 
~ Ana County, 530 S.W.2d 879 (Tex.Civ.App. 1975), the 
defendants' remedy in a situation such as this is to appeal 
the trial court's decision on jurisdiction .. In that case, 
defendant made a special appearance but was overruled. The 
appellate record does not indicate whether the trial court's 
judgment was highly contested or even if there were evidence 
presented; it merely recites that there was a certified copy 
of the Order Overruling the Special Appearance. The appellate 
court, after citing numerous precedents, cites Section 9 of 
the Restatement of Judgments: 
Where a defendant appears in an action to 
object that the court has no jurisdiction over 
hi~ and the court overrules the objection and 
judgment is rendered against him, the parties 
are precluded from collaterally attacking the 
judgment on the grounds that the court had no 
jurisdiction over the defendant. 
The court went on to hold that Moody, having entered 
a special appearance in the New Mexico court and having failed 
to appeal the trial court's ruling that it had jurisdiction 
over him, had let the judgment become final and was bound by 
the New Mexico court's ruling. 
Defendants Briggs and Intermountain stand in the same 
position. They had the option to appeal the Texas court's 
-15-
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finding of personal jurisdictione Having failed to do so, the 
Texas judgment became final and is conclusive against them. 
Subpoint B: Under Texas Law, Defendants Waived 
Their Special Appearance, and Having Submitted Themselves to 
the Jurisdiction of the Texas Court, Cannot Now Collateral~ 
Attack That Jurisdiction. 
Under Texas law, defendants Briggs' and Intermoun-
tain's failure to appear at the hearing on their special 
appearance and present facts showing the court's want of 11, 
jurisdiction contituted a waiver of ~I the special nature of 
their appearance and amount to a submission to the court's ~~1 
jurisdiction. Brown v. Brown, 520 s. w. 2d 571, 575 
(Tex. Ci v .App. 197 5) • In that case, defendant, a resident of ~ 
Washington D.C., was served in a Texas action. The defendant! 
filed a special appearance, objecting to the personal juris- i~ 
diction of the court. After filing the special appearance iii 
defendant never caused his special appearance to be set down ut 
for hearing. Nor did he of fer or try to offer proof of the ~e 
factual basis of his contention that the court lacked :~ 
authority to exercise its jurisdiction. On appeal, the Texas 1~1 
Supreme Court indicated that the defendant's special ~l 
appearance was, of itself, an appearance. It constituted a ::.! 
submission to the court's jurisdiction unless proof was made ::t 
of facts showing the absence of such jurisdiction. 
those facts, the defendant had the burden of proof. 
-16-
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;l 
Such is the situation in 
TJefendants Briggs and Intermountain had 
ducing evidence to demonstrate the 
the instant case .. 
the burden of pro-
court' s lack of 
jurisdiction. They failed to carry that burden or prooL 
the court had overruled defendants' special 
defendants had placed the merits at issue as a 
their having filed an answer responding to 
Hence, once 
appearance, 
result of 
plaintiff's petitione Defendants made no attempt to withdraw 
their answer or otherwise prevent their answer from being 
operative once the special appearance was overruled. 
The basis for the court's decision in Brown, supra, 
can be better understood with some background knowledge con-
cerning the history of jurisdiction and the special appearance 
in the State of Texas. The subject is very thoroughly 
discussed and analyzed by Professer E. Wayne Thode in an 
article entitled: "In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 2031B, 
the Texas 'Long Arm' Jurisdiction Statute; and the Appearance 
to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere," which 
appeared in 42 Tex.L.Rev. 279 (1964). The Thode article is 
quite lengthy. However, comments particularly applicable to 
the situation at hand can be gleaned from a reading of the 
introduction, together with pages 311 through 320. 
Prior to 1962, the Texas case of York v. State, 73 
Tex. 651, 11 s.w. 869 (1889), affirmed, 137 U.S. 15 (1890), 
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established that every appearance in a Texas action consti-
tuted a general appearance. The case was continually cited in 
text books as the ultimate in jurisdictional provincialism. 
However, in 1962, the Supreme Court of Texas promulgated Rule 
120a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure which provides as 
follows: 
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 
121, 122, and 123, a special appearance may be 
made by any party either in per son or by an 
attorney for the purpose of objecting to the 
jurisdiction of the court over t.he person or 
property of the defendant on the ground that 
such person 2!_ property is not amenable to 
process issued by the courts of this state. A 
special appearance may be made as to an entire 
proceeding or as to any severable claim 
involved therein. Such special appearance 
shall be made ~sworn motion filed prior to 
plea of privilege or any other plea, pleading 
or motion; provided, however, that a plea of 
privilege and any other plea, pleading or 
motion may ·be contained in the same instrument 
or filed subsequent thereto without waiver of 
such special appearance. the issuance of pro-
cess for witnesses, the taking of depositions, 
the serving of requests for admissions, and 
the use of discovery processes, shall not 
constitute a waiver of such special 
appearance. Every appearance, prior to ~­
ment, not in compliance with this rule is a 
general appearance. {Emphasis added.) 
2. 
3. • 
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 121, 122, and 123, 
the very provisions that furnish the basis for the decision in 
York v. State, provided the following: 
-18-
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1. That the filing of an answer shall constitute an 
appearance of the defendant so as to dispense with the 
necessity for the issuance of service of citation upon hime 
2., That if service were quashed on motion, the 
defendant was deemed to have entered an appearance at the next 
term of court. 
3.. That if judgments were reversed on appeal for 
want of service or defects in service, the defendant was 
deemed to have entered his appearance to the term of the trial 
court at which the mandate was filed. 
It is significant that Rules 121, 122, and 123 remain 
intact and effective except insofar as they are modified by 
the provisions of Rule 120a. Therefore, York v. State con-
tinues to control the defendant's appearance in court unless 
the defendant makes a special appearance as authorized by Rule 
120a. The last sentence of subdivision (1) of Rule 120a makes 
this clear beyond dispute. "Every appearance, prior to 
judgment, not in compliance with this rule is a general 
appearance." 
The key words delineating the scope of the special 
appearance are: "That such party or property is not amenable 
to process issued by the courts of this State." A party may 
appear to challenge the jurisdiction of the Texas court over 
his person or his property, and if the challenge is within the 
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scope of Rule 120a, the appearance will not thereby result in 
the court obtaining in personam jurisdiction over him. The 
court must find that the defendant or his property "is not 
amenable to process." 
The words "not amenable to process issued by the 
courts of this state" can only be interpreted to mean that the 
special appearance is available solely to establish that the 
Texas court cannot, under the federal and state constitutions 
and the appropriate state statutes, validly obtain jur isdic-
tion over the person or the property of the defendant with 
regard ,to the cause of action pled. Defective service or 
defective process, or even an attempt to bring the defendant 
before the court under the wrong statutes does not authorize 
the use of the special appearance. If a defendant attempts to 
make a special appearance to raise any of these contentions, 
then his appearance is a general one and the rule of York v. 
State·applies to him. with full force. 
It follows, then, that a special appearance must be :i 
grounded upon the proper contention; namely that the defendant 
is not amenable to process in the State of Texas. An examina-
tion of the special appearance and motion to quash filed by 
defendant Briggs in the Texas action makes it evident that he 
failed to comply with Rule 120a. Briggs' special appearance 
was based upon the contention that he was not a true party in 
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interest to the lawsuit and that he had not at any time done 
business in the State of Texas and had been improperly served. 
His special appearance was clearly inadequate. It is entirely 
possible that the allegations contained in his special 
appearance could have been determined to be true and yet he 
could still have been amenable to process in the State of 
Texas. In failing to make a proper special appearance, his 
appearance must be regarded under Texas law as a general 
apearance. 
Defendant Briggs' special appearance is defective in 
another way. Rule 120a requires that the special appearance 
be made by sworn motion. Again, an examination of Briggs' 
special appearance makes it clear that he failed to comply 
with this requirement. As pointed out by Professor Thode, 
"The defendant, even though not amenable to process, must 
proceed carefully in making his special appearance. There are 
pitfalls in the mechanics of presenting his plea which, if not 
avoided, will of themselves confer jurisdiction in personam. 
The procedural device to be used by defendant in making his 
special appearance is a sworn motion to the jurisdiction." 
Id. at 315. 
The language of Rule 120a placed on the defendant the 
burden of pleading, of presenting evidence and of persuasion. 
The Rule provides a specific exception to the Rule of York v. 
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State, and the quid pro quo extracted from the defendant is 
that he has the burden of extablishing that exception. If he 
fails to carry the burden of proof, he has not met the 
requirements of Rule 120a and "every appearance, prior to 
judgment, not in compliance with this Rule is a general 
appearance.," 
Defendants in the instant case did not carry their 
burden of proof and consequently failed to meet the require-
men ts of Rule 120a. Therefore, they cannot avail themselves 
of the exception it provides, and their attempted special 
~~ 
appearance was rendered a general appearance under Texas law. 
Having submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Texas ~1 
• )1( 
court through this general apearance, they were bound by the 
court's decision. :i( That decision should have been upheld by 
the Utah trial court as a matter of law under the full faith '"' 
and credit clause. 
Subpoint C: The Trial Court Erred In Relying On 
Chevron Chemical Company v. Mecham, 550 P. 2d 182 (Utah 1976), ~!c 
As Determinative of Whether the Texas Judgment is Res Judica-
ta on the Issue of Personal Jurisdiction. 
In its memorandum opinion of September 27, 1979, the 
trial court relied upon the Utah case of Chevron Chemical ~1 
Company v. Mecham, 550 P.2d 182 (1976), in denying plaintiff's ila 1 
motion for summary judgment. ", The plaintiff had argued that .:a, 
the Texas judgment was res judicata as against defendants on :~ 
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all issues, including that of jurisdiction .. The trial court 
held as a matter of law that that proposition "was clearly 
rejected, at least by implication, in the Chevron case." (R 
101). Such a holding seems tenuous at best. 
In Chevron, the defendant was a Utah resident and an 
officer of an Idaho corporation named Great Basin Grain 
Company. Great Basin wanted to open an account with Chevron 
to purchase fertilizer. Chevron refused to establish such an 
account unless the incorporators of Great Basin signed per-
sonal guarantees. Chevron solicited and obtained from defen-
dant Mecham and one other officer a joint guarantee. When 
Great Basin subsequently defaulted on its account, suit was 
brought by Chevron against both guarantors. Defendant Mecham 
made a special appearance in the Idaho proceedings to 
challenge the court's jurisdiction, but judgment was neverthe-
less entered against him. Thereafter, Chevron initiated suit 
in Utah, seeking enforcement of the Idaho judgment against 
Mecham. In the Utah court, Mecham contested the jurisdiction 
of the Idaho court, and the trial court found in his favor. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme court noted in passing Mecham' s 
special appearance in the Idaho trial, but went on to recon-
sider the nature and quantity of the defendant's contacts with 
Idaho on which the original court had based its long-arm 
jurisdiction. Finding those contacts insufficient, the Utah 
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Supreme court refused to enforce the Idaho judgment. 
The lower court in the instant case relied solely 
upon Chevron for its denial of plaintiff Harr is' motion for 
summary judgment. It interpreted the case to stand for the 
proposition that the Idaho court's overruling of defendant's 
special appearance was not res judicata against him in the 
subsequent suit. Hence, the Utah court was free to review the 
question of long-arm jurisdiction on the merits. (R 101-102). 
However, a review of the record on appeal in the 
Chevron case reveals that neither party argued this 
proposition. It was never mentioned on appeal, never 
discussed in the appellate briefs, never presented to the Utah 
supreme Court for its consideration, and never discussed by 
that court in its opinion. The arguments on appeal asked the 
court to decide two issues: (1) the nature, quality and 
quantity of defendant Mecham' s contacts with Idaho so as to 
justify that forum's assertion of jurisdiction over him under 
standards of "minimum contacts," and ( 2) whether Idaho could 
properly assert long-arm jurisdiction over Mecham as an indi-
vidual when all of his contacts with that state were in the J~ 
capacity of a corporate officer, a position he had resigned 
some years before the Idaho suit was initiated. The Utah 
Supreme Court's opinion addressed only these two issues. It 
mentioned Mecham' s special appearance only by way of ~~ 
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1: 
I~ 
background, and it did not develop any possible implications 
of that appearancee 550 P.2d at 183. Given that the scope of 
argument and decision were limited to the two issues stated 
above, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conclude 
as a matter of law that the Chevron case foreclosed debate on 
the question of whether a special appearance in one court will 
be ~ judicata in a later court. The Chevron court certainly 
did not squarely decide the question, and at best, it is 
dubious whether it intended to address the question at all, 
even by implication. 
Moreover, even if the Chevron case had indeed held 
that the Idaho decision was not ~ judicata on the question 
of jurisdiction, it cannot be held as a matter of law that the 
Texas court did not have jurisdiction over defendants Briggs 
and Intermountain. If the trial court in the present case is 
freed by Chevron to retry the question of jurisdiction, it 
must do so in accordance with standards of "minimum contacts." 
The nature and frequency of Briggs' and Intermountain's con-
tacts will be discussed below in Point II, but it must be 
noted here that defendants Briggs and Interrnountain had signi-
ficantly more contacts with Texas than Mecham had with Idaho. 
Hence, the Texas court could have obtained jurisdiction over 
the defendants on the basis of their contacts with that state 
which were sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" stan-
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dards of Chevron and its precursors. 
Therefore, even aside from the res judicata question 
of Chevron, it cannot be held as a matter of law that the 
Chevron case precludes enforcement of the Texas judgment 
because the Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants. The Texas court's assert~on of jurisdiction over 
Briggs· and Intermountain may have been proper under a "minimum 
contacts" analysis, even if it failed under a res judicata 
theory. 
In summary, the judgment entered against the defen-
dants by the Texas district court is res judicata on the 
jurisdictional question and the defendants should have been 
es topped from litigating that issue in the Utah court. The 
trial court should have granted the Texas judgment full faith 
and credit on either of the above grounds. First, because the 
issue of jurisdiction was raised and litigated in the Texas 
action, or second, because the defendants' appearance in the 
Texas proceeding constituted a general appearance, thereby 
waiving any jurisdictional defense which they may have had. 
The trial court's reliance on Chevron as determinative of the 
res judicata question was misplaced in light of a closer ana-
lysis of the opinion and its rationale. 
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r: 
I~ , 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE TEXAS COURT DID NOT H"°AVE JURISDICTiO~ 
OVER THE DEFENDANTS AT THE TIME IT ENTERED ITS JUDGMENT. 
Subpoint A: The District Court of Texas Properly 
Acquired Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendants Under its 
Long-Arm Statute. 
Section 3 of the Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann, Art.203lb pro-
vides that: 
Any foreign corporation • . or nonresident 
natural person that engages in business in 
this State • • • and does not maintain a place 
of regular business in this State or a 
designated agent upon whom service may be made 
upon causes of action arising out of such 
business done in this State, the act or acts 
of engaging in such business within this State 
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment 
by such foreign corporation • • • or nonresi-
dent natural person of the Secretary of State 
of Texas as agency upon whom service of pro-
cess may be made in any action, suit or pro-
ceedings arising out of such business done in 
this State, wherein such corporation, •. o or 
nonresident natural person is a party or is to 
be made a party. 
In short, service of process upon the Texas Secretary of State 
is proper only where the foreign corporation or nonresident 
• natural person satisfies three threshold requirements: (1) he 
i: does not maintain a regular place of business in Texas, (2) he 
~ has not designated an agent in Texas for service, and (3) he 
engages in business in Texas. This third requirement is 
further defined in Section 4 of the same act: 
For the purpose of this Act, • • • any foreign 
corporation • • • or nonresident natural per-
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son shall be deemed doing business in this 
State by entering into contract by mail or 
otherwise with a resident of Texas to be per-
formed in whole or in part by either party in 
this State. (Emphasis added). 
In the Texas action, both Briggs and Intermountain 
admitted all three threshold requirements. In addition to 
alleging that they were not residents of Texas (R 64, <ill), 
they both admitted that they had never maintained a regular 
place of business in the State of Texas (R 64, 111) • They 
further admitted that they t:iad never appointed an agent in 
Texas for service of process. (R 64, 111)_. 
Finally, they admitted that they had entered into a 
General Agency Agreement with Mobile Insurance Company, whom 
they knew to be, and who in fact was, a resident of Texas. (R 
64, 112 referring to R 134). This contract fell squarely 
within the definitional language of "doing business" above. 
One of the parties was a Texas company and all of its contrac-
tual obligations were to be performed in Texas. For example, 
all records were stored and generated in Texas, loss claims 
were filed, reviewed and either allowed or disallowed in Texas 
and the general activities and issuing and servicing of 
insurance policies occurred in Texas. In addition, all 
payments pursuant to the contract were made by defendants to 
the Texas off ice. The defendants engaged in a continuous, 
systematic and well-established course of business with a 
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Texas company, and this has been held to satisfy the "doing 
business" requirement of long-arm jurisdiction both under 
Texas law specifically in U-Anchor Advertising v. Burt, 553 
S .. W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), and more generally in Savarese v. 
Edrick Transfer & Storage, Inc., 513 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Since all three prerequisites for the application of 
the Texas "long-arm" statute were met, the Texas court pro-
perly acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendants by 
serving process on the Texas Secretary of State. 
Subpoint B: The Exercise Of In Personam Juris-
diction Over Defendants ~The Texas Court Pursuant to Tex. 
Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann Art. 203l(b) Did Not Violate The Require-
ments of Due Process. 
A state court may extend the reach of its long-arm 
statute as far as the federal constitutional requirements of 
due process will allow. Thus, a state can exercise personal 
jurisdiction within the limits of due process if the nonresi-
dent defendant has certain "minimum contacts" with the forum 
state such that maintenance of the suit in that state does not 
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
66 s.ct. 154 (1945). 
In determining whether this test has been met, the 
Texas Supreme Court in O'Brien v. Lanpar Company, 399 S.W.2d 
340 (Tex. 1966) has recognized three basic elements that must 
exist to sustain jurisdiction over nonresidents. Those ele-
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ments include the following: 
(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation 
must purposefuly do some act or consummate some transaction in 
the foreign state; 
(2) The cause of action must arise from, or be con-
nected with, such act or transaction; and 
(3) The assumption of jurisdiction by the forum 
state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, 
nature and extent of the activity in the forum state, the 
relative convenience of the parties, the benefits of the pro-
tection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective 
parties, and the basic equities of the situation. 
See also U-Anchor Advertising v. Burt, 533 S.W.2d 760 
(Tex. 1977). 
1. Defendants herein purposefully acted 
and/or consummated one or more transactions in the State of 
Texas. 
Defendants entered into a contract which was perfor-
mable in whole or in part in the State of Texas. However, as 
explained in U-Anchor, supra, the mere fact that defendants 
entered into a contract performable in whole or in part in the 
State of Texas is not sufficient in and of itself to provide 
the Texas Court with the minimum contacts which are required. 
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Therefore, the activities of the defendant must be examined to 
determine n e that there be some act by which the defen-
dant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
u .. s. 235 (1958). In U-Anchor, supra, a contract between the 
defendant Oklahoma business man and a Texas advertising com-
pany was solicited by the Texas company in Oklahoma, executed 
in Oklahoma, and required the Texas company to place displays 
in Oklahoma. The only contact that the defendant had with 
Texas was that he was required to send his payments to the 
company's office in Amarillo. When the contract was breached, 
the advertising company attempted to sue the defendant in 
Texas. The Texas Supreme Court held tht the exercise of long-
arm jurisdiction would violate the defendant's right to due 
process of law: 
"In the instant case the contacts of Burt with 
Texas are minimal and fortuitous, and he can-
not be said to have 'purposefully' conducted 
activities within the State. Burt's contacts 
with Texas were not grounded on any expec-
tation or necessity of invoking the benefits 
and protections of Texas law, nor were they 
designed to result in profit from a business 
transaction undertaken in Texas. The contract 
was solicited, negotiated, adn consummated in 
Oklahoma, and Burt did nothing to indicate or 
to support an inference of any purpose to 
exercise the privilege of doing business in 
Texas. Simply stated, Burt was a passive 
customer of a Texas corporation who neither 
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sought, initiated, nor profited from his 
single and fortuitous contact with Texas." 
553 S.W.2d at 763. 
By comparison, the contacts of defendants in the instant case 
were not minimal and fortuitous. They were, rather, massive 
and intentional. These defendants conducted an entire 
insurance business between themselves in Utah and the Texas 
insurance company, which involved numerous contacts back and 
forth, including the creation of the account which is now 
being sued upon. Briggs and Intermountain were not "passive 
customers" of Mobile; they actively sought a contract with it 
in the expectation of private profit. By purpose fully 
availing themselves of the privilege of conducting such 
business, the defendants invoked the benefits and protections 
of the laws of Texas, specifically the laws regulating the 
Texas insurance industry. Accordingly, the first element of 
the text was satisfied. 
2. The cause of action arose from and was 
connected with the actions of defendants conducted in the State 
of Texas. 
It is very clear that plaintiff's cause of action is 
connected with defendants' actions in Texas in that this is a 
suit based on the Agency Contract and the insurance business 
conducted pursuant to the contract. Productions Promotions, 
Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). The second 
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:i: 
element of the test was therefore satisfied. 
3.. The assumption of jurisdiction £y_ the 
Texas court does not offend the traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice. 
As noted by the Texas Supreme Court in U-Anchor, the 
nature and extent of the contacts of a nonresident with the 
forum state will determine whether the court may exercise 
jurisdiction over that nonresident. The extent of defendants' 
contacts with Texas clearly and obviously indicate that the 
Texas courts could exercise jurisdiction over them. It is 
also important to note that the nature of defendants' activi-
ties is a continuing business enterprise requiring almost 
daily supervision and communications. This is to be 
contrasted wtih the factual situations where occasional or 
chance contact is made with the forum state or the activities 
are of such an insubstantial nature that it does offend the 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. As 
stated in Products Promotions, Inc., such contacts with the 
state are "purely fortuitous or accidental." 
Defendants herein purposefully conducted business in 
Texas pursuant to a contract with a Texas resident and enjoyed 
the benefits and protections of the laws of Texas. Defendants 
benefited not only from their actual interrelationship with a 
Texas insurance company, but also enjoyed the benefits and 
-33-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
protections provided by the Texas Insurance Code, the Texas 
State Board of Insurance and state agencies authorized under 
the laws of Texas to regulate the insurance industry in Texas. 
Even though defendants were physically located in Utah, every-
time they wrote a policy, they were directly affecting a very 
controlled and regulated industry in Texas. Each policy 
written, affected the reserves which the company was required 
by law in Texas to maintain. Each policy written also affected 
the ability of the company in Texas to pay the claims of its 
policyholders which also, in turn, affected reserves required 
by law. The defendants, with the right to bind the Texas 
insurance company were in effect an arm of the Texas company. 
By invoking those benefits and protections, defendants cannot 
now be allowed to object to the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the Texas courts. The "traditional notions of fair play" have 
been clearly met. Diversified Resources Corp. ~ Geodyna-
mics, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Civ.App. 1977). 
In support of their motion, defendants relied upon 
the Utah case of Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 
(1959). The Court there found that a single contact or act by 
a Utah resident was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over ~ 
the Utah resident in an Illinois court. The Utah court·· 
pointed to the requirement of some continuity of activity in.: 
order to satisfy the "minimum contacts" requirement. In the 1 
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instant case, we have precisely the ongoing and continuous 
business relationship which the Utah court was looking for in 
Not only does the nature and extent of defendants' 
activity in Texas justify the assumption of jurisdiction by 
the Texas Court, the basic equities and relative convenience 
to the parties dictate that the case should have been prose-
cu ted in Texas. In support of this proposition, plaintiff 
would point out that defendants not only purposefully aff i-
liated themselves with a Texas business, but that voluminous 
records of the insurance company were and are now stored in 
the Receiver's office in Austin, Texas, and that the transfer 
of such records out of the state would have been and would be 
expensive and hazardous to the integrity of the documents. It 
was not unreasonably inconvenient to require defendants to 
litigate this cause of action in Texas given the circumstances 
of this action and the relationship between defendants and the 
State of Texas. 
It would have been and would be, however, incon-
venient to require plaintiff to litigate each cause of action 
against each nonresident insurance agent in their respective 
states. Not only is it more convenient to allow plaintiff to 
litigate each cause of action in Travis County, Texas, it is 
also more equitable to the receivership estate and its many 
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creditors, claimants and individual insureds, including Utah 
residents, entitled to disbursements from the receivership 
estate for the numerous causes of action against nonresident 
agents to be prosecuted in an efficient and economical manner. 
Duplication, waste and inefficiency will result if the 
receiver must pursue each nonresident insurance agent in the 
courts of that agent's state. 
In terms of what is fair and reasonable, plaintiff 
respectfully submits that it is imminently fair and reasonable 
to require defendants to litigate their case in Texas, espe-
cially when one considers that defendants have on the one hand 
filed or caused claims to be filed in Texas with the 
receivership, and 6n the other hand, are refusing to turn over 
to the plaintiff assets of the very receivership estate 
against which the claims have been filed. 
The most recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion to con-
sider long-arm jurisdiction emphasized due process require-
ments in terms of foreseeability. World-wide Volkswagen Corp. 
~Woodson, 48 U.S.L.W. 4079 (January 21, 1980), involved a 
suit by a husband and wife who purchased a car in New York and 
the following year, passing through Oklahoma on their way to a 
new home in Arizona, were struck in the rear by another car, 
causing a fire which severely burned the wife and the two 
children. The plaintiffs sued the New York automobile 
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retailer and its wholesaler in the courts of Oklahoma. The 
defendants entered special appearances claiming that 
Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over them would violate 
due process inasmuch as they made no sales nor performed any 
services in Oklahoma, they solicited no business there, and 
did not avail themselves of the benefit or protection of 
Oklahoma law. The trial court ruled it had jurisdiction, and 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court subsequently refused to grant a 
writ of prohibition to restrain the trial judge from exer-
cising in personam jurisdiction over them. On appeal, the u. 
s. Supreme Court found that the plaintiff's attempt to base 
jurisdiction on "one, isolated occurrence • the for-
tui tous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in 
New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident 
while passing through Oklahoma," was insufficient contact to 
satisfy constitutional due process requirements. Id. at 4082. 
Responding to the plaintiff's argument that use of the car in 
Oklahoma was foreseeable, the Court stated: 
['l'J he foreseeability that is er i ti cal to due 
process analysis is not the mere likelihood 
that a product will find its way into the 
forum State. Rather, it is that the 
defendant's conduct and connection with the 
forum State are such that he should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there • • • 
When a corporation 'purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State," Hanson v. 
Denkla, supra at 253, it has clear notice that 
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it is subject to suit there, and can act to 
alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by 
procuring insurance, passing the expected 
costs on to customers, or, if the risks are 
too great, severing its connection with the 
State. Id. at 4082. 
By comparison with the instant case, it can quickly be seen 
that the jurisdiction over the defendants Briggs and 
Intermountain is no "isolated occurrence" nor a "fortuitous 
circumstance." Both defendants purposefully entered into a 
contract with a company they knew to be located in Texas and 
which had its primary place of business in Texas. Their con-
tinuous interaction with the Texas principal gave them suf-
f icient notice that they would perhaps be subjected to the 
personal jurisdiction of the Texas courts. Their conduct and 
connections with the Texas forum were such that they could 
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Hence, 
the assumption of jurisdiction by the Texas court in the 
instant case did not exceed the constitutional limitations of 
due process. 
Subpoint C: The Nature and Extent of the 
Contacts !U7_Defendants with the Forum Stateclearly Meet the : 
Requirements Set by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. 
Piper Aircraft Corporation, 578 P.2d 850 (1978), very clearly 
adopted the position that jurisdictional standards under the 
Utah Long-Arm Statute should be as broad as permissible by 
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federal due process limitations. This is, as pointed out 
above, the same position as taken by the Texas supreme Court. 
In Abbott, the Court at page 853 cited with approval 
the following language of the United States Supreme Court in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 UeS. 310, 66 S.Cte 
152, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). 
But to the extent that a corporation exercises 
the privilege of conducting activities within 
a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection 
of the laws of that state. The exercise of 
that privilege may give rise to obligations; 
and, so far as those obligations arise out of 
or are connected with the activities within 
the state, a procedure which requires the cor-
poration to respond to a suit brought to 
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be 
said to be undue. 
Certainly, such is the situation in the instant case. 
The Utah Court, in Producers Livestock Loan Co. v. 
Miller, 580 P.2d 603 (1978), again emphasized the distinction 
between situations where the defendant has been involved in 
only a single or transitory act in the forum -state and 
situations where the defendant has engaged in a continuing 
L activity and has availed himself of the benefit and protection 
!t: 
,,; 
of the laws of the forum state. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court framed its most 
- recent decision on long-arm jurisdiction in even broader 
language. In Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, (No. 15709, 
filed March 4, 1980, Utah) , the plaintiff was a Utah cor-
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poration which initiated a contract with the defendant, a 
California corporation having its principal place of business 
in San Francisco. The defendant's only contacts with the 
state of Utah were (1) sending a price list on its drilling 
equipment, at the request of the plaintiff, to his home in 
springvill~; (2) sending an invoice to plaintiff; (3) entering 
into a security agreement with the plaintiff which designated 
Mapleton as the situs of the equipment even though the machi-
nery was delivered to Denver, taken immediately to New Mexico 
and only much later moved into Utah; and (4) sending represen-
tati ves to examine and repair the machinery when it malfunc-
tioned in Utah. Plaintiff brought suit in a Utah court for 
breach of warranty. The trial court held that the California 
corporation did not have sufficient contacts with the Utah 
for um to appy the long-arm s ta tu te. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed. Discussing the requirements of "minimum contacts," 
the court stated: 
Here, the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint 
show that their claims arise out of 
defendant's contacts with this State, which 
were (1) defendant purposefully contracted 
with a resident of this State, knowing that it 
was a resident, and (2) defendant purposefully 
undertook to supply goods to that resident 
reasonably knowing or anticipating that those 
goods would be used in this State. 
Turning finally to the considerations of fair play and 
substantial justice, the court concluded: 
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[W]e hold that assertion of jurisdiction is in 
harmony with the requirements of due process 
owed to the defendant under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As noted earlier, defendant's 
actions were purposeful, and with a view to 
derive substantial economic benefit from the 
plaintiff. It reasonably knew that if the 
equipment were defective, any injury caused by 
such defects could well be sustained here. 
The very fact that defendant agreed by the 
security agreement entered into between Burt 
and defendant that the situs of this expensive 
equipment should be the State of utah, reveals 
that defendant sought the protection of the 
laws of Utah in transacting this business. By 
these acts, defendant has submitted itself to 
this jurisdiction to answer for any claims 
arising out of those acts. No. 15709 at 4. 
Under the tests established by the Utah Court in this 
most recent decision, it cannot be easily argued that Briggs 
and Interrnountain should not be subjected to the long-arm 
jurisdiction of the Texas court. Indeed, like the defendant 
in Burt Drilling, above, they purposefully contracted with a 
Texas resident, knowing that it was a resident. They under-
took to solicit insurance and negotiate policies and contracts 
on behalf of the Texas company. They sought the protection of 
the laws of Texas in transacting this business, and they did 
all this intending to derive substantial economic benefit from 
the Texas plaintiff. Defendants Briggs and Intermountain 
should reasonably have anticipated the possibility that they 
would be subjected to the jurisdiction of a Texas court to 
answer for any claims which arose out of their interaction 
with the Texas company. under the tests of Burt Drilling 
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above, requiring them to do so when that possibility became a 
reality would not violate their Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
due process. 
In summary, the trial court erred when it held as a 
matter of law that the Texas court never acquired personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants. The Texas court complied 
with every procedural requirement of its long-arm statute. 
substantively, that statute itself is effective to the 
fqrthest limits of the due process clause, defined by the con-
cept of "minimum contacts" and "traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice." The extension of long-arm 
jurisdiction by the Texas forum to Briggs and Intermountain in 
the instant case is soundly within the scope of due process 
whether defined by the Texas Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme 
court or the U.S. Supreme Court. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS HAD CROSS CLAIMS AGAINST THEIR ~ :i 
SUB-AGENTS DUE PROCES'SREQUIRES THAT PLAINTIFF LITIGATE ill_ " 
CLAIM IN UTAH. 
UI 
On reconsideration, defendant Briggs submitted to the ~I 
trial court an affidavit in which he stated that he and 
Intermountain had cross-claims against 40 to 45 of their 
sub-agents. The trial court relied heavily on this claim in .. 
..i 
its second memorandum opinion of November 15, 1979 (R 153). 
~~. 
It noted that because these cross-claimants were in Utah and 
had no contacts with the Texas forum, they could not be joined 
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in the Texas proceedinge It then held as a matter of law that 
due process required the Texas plaintiff to reli tigate its 
claims in a Utah court so that defendants could implead their 
sub-agents. 
The fact that defendants in the instant case have 
disputed claims against their own sub-agents is of no moment 
in this appeal and should be given negligible weight in the 
trial court's determination of due process requirements. The 
plaintiff-receiver for the Texas company is suing upon a 
contract negotiated between that company and the defendants. 
The cause of action arises solely on the respective contrac-
tual obligations between those two parties, and no one else. 
Mobile and Briggs and Intermountain stand in privity of 
contract as principal and agents, but this relationship is not 
extended to the defendants' sub-agents. Whatever contractual 
arrangements the defendants have entered with their 
sub-agents, it is clear that those arrangements are distinct 
from the contract which forms the basis of the suit on appeale 
They stem from a separate contract, they involve a separate 
cause of action, and defendants' sub-agents need not be joined 
to fully litigate the question of defendants' liability to 
plaintiff. The court in Bracey ~Gray, 150 Pe2d 564 
(Cal.App. 1944), held that the California statute authorizing 
the bringing in of additional parties does not give the court 
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power to bring into the action a controversy between the 
defendant and strangers to the action which is irrelevant to 
the action between the parties already before the court. Id. 
at 566. The defendants' sub-agents are strangers to the cause 
of action which grew out of the agency agreement between 
plaintiff and defendants. Any claims they may assert against 
defendants, or vice versa, are irrelevant to the judgment in 
the Texas court. 
Similarly, the presence or absence of cross-claims by 
third parties should not affect a 'minimum contacts' analysis. 
The Texas court based its personal jurisdiction on the 
agreement between the plaintiff and defendants and the actions 
and contacts with the Texas forum which that agreement made 
necessary. The fact that defendants' sub-agents were not 
bound by the agreement and had no contacts with the State of 
Texas does not alter or reduce the nature and quantity of 
defendants' own contacts nor should it render them less ame-
nable to long-arm jurisdiction under a minimum contacts 
analysis. 
Requiring the plaintiff to relitigate its claims in 
Utah in an action consolidated with the cross-claims of 
defendants' sub-agents will not secure defendants' due process 
of law as much as it will confuse and delay the adjudication 
of the issues. The rights and liabilities between plaintiff 
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and defendants stem from one contract with its particular 
language and implications, while the rights and liabilities 
between defendants and their agents stem from a separate 
contract with different language and implications. The Utah 
courts are bound by the rule that: 
Third party practice is permitted only where 
the original defendant can show that if he is 
found liable to the plaintiff then the third 
party will be liable to the defendant. Hughes 
v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1979). 
Because the defendants Briggs and Intermountain may be liable 
on different theories or for breach of different obligations 
under their contract with plaintiff and their second set of 
contracts with their sub-agents, it may not be possible, under 
the above rule, to consolidate the causes of action at trial. 
Briggs and Intermountain make no showing that if they were 
found liable to Mobile, that their sub-agents would be liable 
to them. Indeed, due process is perhaps best served not by a 
consolidated trial, but by a separate trial on the issues 
involving the sub-agents. Moreover, it must be noted that, 
with regard to any remedies against their sub-agents, 
defendants' due process rights remain totally uncompromised by 
the Texas judgment. Whatever the contractual rights and 
liabilities between defendants and their sub-agents, the Texas 
adjudication between plaintiff and defendants leaves them 
unaffected. Even if the Texas judgment were ultimated 
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enforced, the defendants would still be entitled to their day 
in court vis-a-vis their sub-agents. 
The enforcement of the Texas judgment would not 
seriously infringe the defendants' right to due process. 
First because they have already been afforded one day in court 
on the issue of liability on the contract between them and 
Mobile, albeit they did not avail themselves of the 
opportunity. And secondly because the defendants' rela-
tionship with their sub-agents remains unaffected regardless 
of whether the Texas judgment is sustained or mooted. 
However, a failure to enforce the Texas judgment could result 
in great hardship for the plaintiff and a denial of its due 
process rights. In United Bank of Denver National Assoc. v. 
Shavlik, 189 Colo. 280, 541 P.2d 317 (1975), the Colorado 
Supreme Court recently said of third-party imp leader 
procedure: 
The purposes of the rule--including avoiding 
circuity of actions and inconsistent result--
must be balanced against any prejudice the 
impleaded party or the original plaintiff 
might suffer in having the matter resolved in 
the same suit rather than in a separate suit 
brought by the original defendant. Id. at ~' 
541 P.2d at 319. ---
Requiring plaintiff to retry the Texas judgment in a 
Utah court would necessitate the transportation of hundreds of 
documents at great expense and delay both for the receiver 
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himself, and for all those, including numerous Utah residents, 
who have filed claims against the receivership. Moreover, as 
discussed above, the consolidation of plaintiff's and 
sub-agent's claims against the same defendants but on separate 
contracts will needlessly complicate the issues at trial and 
confuse the litigation. 
In view of the difficulties and hardship con-
solidating trial in a Utah forum presents, it cannot be said 
as a matter of law that due process require this solution. A 
better and fairer accommodation of the due process interests 
of all the parties involved would require that the judgment of 
the Texas court, where plaintiff encountered the least 
hardship and where defendants have already had their turn at 
bat, be enforced. The sub-agents would be accorded a separate 
trial in the Utah courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in refusing to extend full 
faith and credit to the Texas judgment. It wrongly held as a 
matter of law that the Texas district court did not have per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendants at the time judgment 
was entered. Defendants could have preserved the jur isdic-
tional question by either making no appearance in the Texas 
proceeding and litigating the issue in the Utah court or by 
appealing the Texas decision. But defendants chose to do 
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neither. Therefore, having raised the issue of jurisdiction, 
the court's judgment is res judicata as against the 
defendants, notwithstanding the fact that they did not avail 
themselves of the opportunity for hearing on the special 
appearance. Even had they appeared to argue the jur isdic-
tional question, their special appearance was procedurally 
defective and, under Texas law, cons ti tu ted a general 
appearance which foreclosed further attack on the question of 
in personam jurisdiction. On either rationale, defendants 
permitted the Texas judgment to become final, and they are 
bound by it. 
The trial court also erred in holding as a matter of 
law that the Texas court never acquired personal jurisdiction 
of the defendants under its long-arm statute. The contacts of 
the defendants with the State of Texas place the Texas court's 
assertion of jurisdiction squarely within permissible consti-
tutional limitations as interpreted by the Texas, Utah and 
United States Supreme Courts. The defendants' argument that 
the Texas court did not have valid personal jurisdiction 
should be overruled, and plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment granted. At best, the nature and extent of 
defendants' contacts with the Texas forum constitute a factual 
question which should be developed on remand. 
Finally, it cannot be held as a matter of law that 
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due process requires the plaintiff to relitigate its claims in 
a Utah forum .. Such a holding unduly penalizes the plaintiff 
without proportionately benefiting the defendants and their 
sub-agents., Balancing the due process interests of all the 
parties involved cannot be done without the court's thorough 
and even-handed investigation of the facts and equities. 
I 
DATED this ~day of April, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN, KENNEDY 
& POWELL 
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